INTRODUCTION
The analysis of k-price auctions for k G 3 has been considered to be an intellectual exercise which does not have economic application. 1 Monderer Ž . and Tennenholtz 1998 suggest that such auctions may play an important role in the new economics evolving in the Internet. 2 In that paper we focus Ž . on on-line Internet auctions, which are widely used as a selling mechanism for relatively cheap items like TV sets or computer products. 3 We end the paper on Internet auctions with a recommendation to auction organizers to use k-price auctions, k G 3. Our main motivation for analyz-* Some of the results in this paper were previously contained in an earlier draft of the Ž manuscript ''Internet Auctions: Are They Gamblers' Attraction?' ' Monderer and Tennen-. holtz, 1998 . We thank Arkadi Nemirovski for helpful discussions. 1 Ž . See Wolfstetter 1996 . 2 The Internet suggests new challenges to economic theory and artificial intelligence research, as it exhibits new forms of interaction which are not captured by existing models Ž . see, e.g., Varian, 1995; Boutilier et al., 1997; Monderer and Tennenholtz, 1999 . 3 See http:rrauction.eecs.umich.edurother-auctions.html for a listing of some of the related Internet auctions and Internet auction houses. 220 0899-8256r00 $35.00 ing k-price auctions is the paper Internet Auctions; we give in Section 7 a brief description of the results obtained there.
In the current paper we discuss the issue of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium strategies in k-price auctions, k G 3. 4 We discuss agents with an arbitrary attitude toward risk. That is, agents may be risk averse or risk seeking, or they may have an alternating attitude toward risk. We use the independent-private-value assumption, which seems to be the right one in auctions with many anonymous participants. We prove that there exists at most one continuous and symmetric equilibrium, and we provide a characterization for such an equilibrium.
Our results on existence and uniqueness are augmented with additional results on the structure of equilibrium strategies. We show that for any Ž . distribution function that satisfies some technical conditions on the types Ž . in a third-price auction we have that a agents with any attitude toward Ž . risk overbid in equilibrium, and b the bids are decreasing with the number of participants when the agents are risk averse. This extends the Ž . Ž . Ž . results obtained by Kagel and Levin 1993 , who proved a and b assuming the uniform distribution function and that the agents are either risk neutral or have constant absolute risk aversion.
k-PRICE AUCTIONS
In this section we present the basic definitions needed for the analysis of k-price auctions of a single item in the independent-private-value model. We assume that the seller is risk-neutral with zero valuation of the object, and that he sets a zero reservation price. All of the results in this paper are naturally extended to positive reservation prices. In a k-price auction, Ž . k G 1, the winner i.e., the agent who gets the object is the one with the highest bid. In a tie, the winner is determined by a lottery with equal probability for each participant with the maximum bid. The winner pays the k-order statistics of the sequence of bids. 5 There are n potential 4 Existence andror uniqueness of equilibrium for first-or second-price auctions with Ž . risk-averse or risk-neutral agents were discussed, e.g., in Riley and Samuelson 1981 and in Ž . Ž . Ž Maskin and Riley 1984 , and more recently, e.g., in Maskin and Riley 1996 , Lebrun 1996 , 1999 , Bajari 1996 , Lizzeri and Persico 1997 , Athey 1997 , and Reny 1998 . Equilibrium Ž . Ž . in k-price auctions, k G 3, was discussed in Kagel and Levin 1993 , Wolfstetter 1996 , and Ž . Ž . implicitly in Athey 1997 and Reny 1998 , who discussed general existence theorems of Ž equilibrium in games with incomplete information see the discussion on noncontinuous . equilibrium strategies in Section 8 . 5 As is common in auction theory, we define the k-order statistics of a sequence of bids as the kth highest bid. According to the standard definition in statistics, the k-order statistics should be the kth lowest bid.
buyers of the object, whom we refer to as agents, denoted by 1, 2, . . . , n, n G 2. The set of agents is denoted by N. The valuation¨of agent i is i w x drawn from the interval 0, 1 according to a random variable¨, which is i distributed according to a distribution function F; F satisfies the following properties:
x ª 0 X Ž . Note that in most of the auction literature D1, D2, and F 0 ) 0 are assumed. In such a case assumption D3 is satisfied. However, we make the weaker assumption D3 because it implies the following desired property: If n n Ž . F satisfies D1᎐D3, so does F for every integer n G 1, where F x s Ž Ž .. n F x . By a repeated application of L'Hopital's rule it can be verified that if F satisfies D1᎐D2 and there exists an integer n G 1 for which the Ž n. w x Ž n. Ž . nth derivative F of F exists in 0, 1 and F 0 / 0, then F satisfies D3.
Ž . X Ž . Note that D3 implies that the function which is F x rF x for 0 -x F 1 w x and 0 at x s 0 is a continuous function on 0, 1 . We denote this function Ž .
by F x rF x . Hence, F 0 rF 0 s 0. We will denote by P the proba-F w x bility measure induced by F on 0, 1 , and for any subset of agents M : N, M w x M we denote by P the product probability measure induced by F on 0, 1 .
F
We assume that all agents have the same von Neumann᎐Morgenstern Ž . utility function u x , yϱ -x -ϱ, which satisfies the following assumptions: . neutral, or u g RN, if u s 0 that is, u x s ax for all x, for some a ) 0 . Ä 4 For every k G 1, n G max 2, k , a utility function u which satisfies U1᎐U3, and a distribution function F which satisfies D1᎐D3, we denote by Ž . A k, n, u, F the k-price auction with these parameters. When some of the parameters are clear, we may omit them. 6 Actually, all of the results in this paper can be proved under weaker conditions than D1᎐D3. These conditions allow both F X and F Y to get the value ϱ at 0. 
Let b be a strategy. For every possible type of agent i,¨, and for every i k Ž < . possible bid x , denote by E x , b¨the expected utility of agent i in the 
Moreo¨er, E2 has at most one solution in the set of all strategies, and such a Ž . solution and in particular e¨ery equilibrium strategy satisfies
The proof of Theorem A for k G 3 is similar to the proof for k s 3, except that the main ideas can easily be seen in the case k s 3, where they are less hidden by the variety of indices. We therefore prove the case k s 3 only. For further references we state Theorem A separately for k s 3: 
Moreo¨er, ET2 has at most one solution in the set of all strategies, and such a Ž . solution and in particular e¨ery equilibrium strategy satisfies
Before we prove Theorem AT we provide the following simple observation, which will be used in the proof of Theorem AT and in the proofs of other results in the paper.
LEMMA B. b is a solution to ET2 when there are n agents and the distribution function is F if and only if b is a solution to ET2 when n s 3 and the distribution function is G s F ny 2 .
Proof of Theorem AT. By Lemma B, it suffices to prove this theorem in the case n s 3 only. The proof follows from the following seven claims, A1᎐A7. The proofs of claims A1, A2, and A3 require tools different from those mainly used in this section, and therefore these proofs will be given only after the proof of the other claims.
Claim A1. Every equilibrium strategy is nondecreasing. Claim A3. Every equilibrium strategy is increasing.
Claim A4. Every equilibrium strategy b satisfies ET2 for n s 3. That
H u x y b t F t dt s 0 for every 0 F x F 1.
Proof. The assertion follows from claims A2 and A3. B Claim A5. Every solution b of ET2 in the set of strategies, and in ns 3 particular every equilibrium strategy, satisfies
Proof. Since b is continuous, we can differentiate both sides of ET2 ns 3 to get
For every x ) 0,
where M is an upper bound of u in the range of the function z, t ª z y Ž . w x b t , t, z g 0, 1 . Therefore by D3 we have Ž . Ž . Claim A5, b 0 s 0 for i s 1, 2, and by 3.2 ,
Since the b 's are bounded and nonnegative, there exists some constant m
y1 is a differentiable function. Since both u y1 and u X are continuously differentiable, two applications of the Mean Value Theorem yield the existence of a positive constant M such that
Ž . Now, replace every t in 3.3 with an s, replace every x with a t, plug in Ž . the resulting inequality in the right-hand side of 3.3 , and get
Repeating this procedure again, we get
By repeating the above procedure n y 1 times we get
Ž .
Ž . The right-hand side of 3.4 converges to 0 when n ª ϱ for every x. Thus
Claim A7. Every increasing strategy b which satisfies ET2 is an ns 3 equilibrium strategy.
To show that b is an equilibrium strategy it suffices to prove that Ž .
Proof of Claim A1. Assume agents 2 and 3 use the equilibrium strategy w x Ž . b. Let¨g 0, 1 . For every 0 F x denote by E¨, x the expected utility 1 1 of agent 1 when he bids x, given that his valuation is¨. That is, Note that there are at most countably many nonnegative numbers z for Ž . which P b s z ) 0, where P is the probability measure induced by F Ž . ␦ -¨q ␦ -¨y ␦ such that for every¨y ␦ -¨-¨q ␦ and
F= F F =F
Ž . Ž . 3.14 Ž . Ž . Ž .
As b has only a countable number of atoms, we can find a decreasing Ž . ϱ Ž . sequence with ) 0, lim s 0, such that P b s x q n ns1 n n ªϱ n F n s 0 and x q -¨. As b is an equilibrium strategy, for every n ) 1, Ž . with b¨s x y . Then, lim¨s¨. As b is an equilibrium stratn n n ªϱ n 1 egy,
Therefore, by taking the limit of the right-hand side of the above inequality when n ª ϱ,
Similarly the inequalities x s¨-¨, in contradiction to the inequality x G¨we proved. B 
THIRD-PRICE AUCTIONS: EXISTENCE IN SPECIAL CASES
Ž . Before we deal in Section 5 with analyzing the issue of the existence of equilibrium, we provide some examples. In this section we relate the following condition to the problem of existence of equilibrium in some special cases: Ž . Note that by Theorem AT, for n s 3, MD is also a necessary condition for the existence of equilibrium.
Constant Absolute Risk Attitude
Roughly speaking, an agent has a constant risk attitude if his attitude toward risk does not depend on his level of wealth. Namely, an agent with Ž . a utility function u has constant absolute risk seeking resp. risk aversion Ž .
C A RS
Consequently, if MD is satisfied, then there exists an equilibrium and b n is the equilibrium strategy.
12 Some of the auction theory that deals with risk-averse agents focuses only on agents with Ž . constant absolute risk aversion see, e.g., Matthews, 1983 . 13 Ž .
C A R A
Kagel and Levin 1993 proved that b is an equilibrium strategy when F is the n uniform distribution.
EXISTENCE OF A SOLUTION TO E2
Ž . Our characterization of equilibrium Theorem A cannot be considered a direct existence theorem. In this section we make a first step toward an existence theorem. By Theorem A, there exists at most one solution to E2 In this section we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a solution when the utility functions are in RA j RS. The conditions we give are not necessary conditions. They are also not the tighter conditions under which our method of proof works. They are, however, easily testable conditions. As was done in previous proofs, we will first reduce the general existence problem to the problem of existence in third-price auctions with Ž Ž .. of strategies b as follows:
For the proof of our theorems we need a few notations concerning such Žw x. operators. Let C s C 0, 1 be the Banach space of continuous functions w x 5 5 < Ž .< on 0, 1 with the max norm. That is, for b g C, b s max b x . All
topological notations in C refer to this norm. Note that C is a complete metric space, and therefore each of its closed subsets is a complete metric space. Let D be a closed subset of C and let S: D ª D. We denote by S n : Ž . Ž . w x b x G x for every x g 0, 1 . By our characterization theorem every equilibrium strategy b must belong to C . Therefore we will be interested in I the fixed point of T in C . However, we first need to know that Tb is well I defined for b g C . To prove that Tb is well defined, we have to show that
Since lim
M r n y 1 ! s 0, the assertion follows. B nªϱ Ž . Claim F2. Let F satisfy D1᎐D3. Let u g RS, with M u s yϱ or yϱ Ž . u g RA. Let T be the operator defined in 5.1 .
Proof. The assertions are true because u X is nonincreasing for u g RA, and u X is nondecreasing for u g RS. B As in the proof of Theorem A, we prove Theorem F for the case k s 3 Ž . only Theorem FT . However, in this case we give a stronger version of Theorem F. We replace the assumption that for u g RS M s yϱ with yϱ Ž Ž . . a weaker assumption that still guarantees that T defined in 5.1 is well defined for u g RS. Under this assumption, the distribution function F and the utility function u satisfy the following property:
Ž . If M u s yϱ, u satisfies DU for every F. However, DU is not yϱ necessarily satisfied in the risk-seeking case.
14 Note that if F and u satisfy DU, so do F n and u for every n G 1. If u g RS, u satisfies DU; then because u X is nondecreasing and because of assumption DU,
yϱ w x for all x g 0, 1 . Hence Tb is well defined.
14 For example, when F is the uniform distribution, u satisfies DU if and only if Ž .
Ž . Ž .
x u 1 -yM u . Thus, if for ) 0, u x s e y 1, satisfies U1᎐U3, but it satisfies DU for yϱ the uniform distribution only if e -2.
Ž . THEOREM FT. Consider the third-price auction A 3, n, u, F . Assume, in addition, that u g RS and that F and u satisfy DU or Note that u g RA j RS satisfies the conditions stated in Theorem FT if there exists yϱ -c -ϱ such that u is an affine function in the interval Ž x yϱ, c .
THIRD-PRICE AUCTIONS WITH VARYING NUMBERS OF PARTICIPANTS
It can be easily derived from Propositions C, D, and E that for u g RN j CARA j CARS the following properties are satisfied in a third-price auction:
Ž .
1 If an equilibrium exists for some n, then it exists for any larger number of participants m ) n.
2 The equilibrium bid is a decreasing function of the number of participants. Ž . Ž . 1 and 2 have already been proved by Kagel and Levin 1993 for u g RN j CARA and the uniform distribution. For this distribution an equilibrium exists for every number of Ž . ŽŽ . Ž .. agents and it is given in the risk-neutral case by b x s n y 1 r n y 2 x. n Ž . We now prove that 2 holds for u g RA when the second derivative of Ž x Ž . u is bounded on yϱ, 1 . We do not know whether 1 holds for u g RA j Ž . RS, or whether 2 holds for u g RS. We actually prove a stronger theorem by proving the monotonicity property for solutions of ET2 that are not necessarily increasing. 
k-PRICE AUCTIONS AND INTERNET AUCTIONS
In the paper ''Internet Auctions: Are They Gamblers' Attraction?'' Ž . Monderer and Tennenholtz, 1998 we recommend to auction organizers that they conduct k-price auctions, k G 3. In this section we briefly discuss the logic beyond this recommendation. The paper uses the independentprivate-value model, which seems to be the appropriate one on the Ž Internet, which involves relatively cheap items without an obvious com-. mon value and many anonymous participants.
The paper has two parts. In the first part it is shown that if agents are risk averse, an auction organizer should prefer a first-price auction to a second-price auction. For the case where this organizer is a monopolist Ž . this result was previously proved by Samuelson 1981 and Ž . Maskin and Riley 1984 . We show that this result continues to hold in an ogopolistic setup if the buyers have constant absolute risk aversion. More Ž . precisely, we deal with a two-stage game the auction selection game . At stage 1 every organizer can choose either a first-or a second-price auction. At the second stage each customer chooses an auction place and a bid as a function of his type. The customers make their choices simultaneously. We prove that there exists a unique continuous subgame perfect equilibrium in Ž . this game if agents have constant absolute risk aversion . In this equilibrium all organizers choose to conduct a second-price auction. Recall that first-price auctions are equivalent to Dutch auctions and that in the independent-private-value model, second-price auctions are equivalent to English auctions. Therefore this result is not consistent with what we see on the Internet, where most of the auctions are English and only a few of them are Dutch. There are many possible explanations for this phenomenon. One such explanation is that participants in such auctions are not risk averse. It seems to us that indeed, Internet auctions attract people Ž . who like lotteries i.e., risk-seeking agents . We have not had the tools to test such a hypothesis, but to some extent, this special characteristic may be explained by the lack of commitment power of Internet auction organizers. We support this hypothesis by showing that when agents are risk seeking, an auction organizer should prefer a second-price auction to a first-price auction in both monopolistic and competitive setups. In the second part of the paper we deal with auction theory with risk-seeking agents. We show that in such a case, an auction organizer should prefer a k-price auction to a second-price auction for every k G 3. We could not rank the revenues obtained in such auctions for different values of k G 3. As is common in the auctions literature, we assume that all agents have the same utility function. We could not handle the nonsymmetric case. Even in our symmetric model we assume, rather than prove, a symmetric equilibrium. We conjecture, however, that it can be proved in our setting that every equilibrium profile is symmetric. 
Random Number of Participants
It is not reasonable to model many auctions, such as Internet auctions, under the assumption that the number of participants is fixed and commonly known. However, since we assume the independent-private value model of information, all, of our results can easily be extended to the case Ž where the number of participants is randomly determined see McAfee . and McMillan, 1987 . 
Nonexistence of Equilibrium
One can detect two types of nonexistence. In one of them a solution to Ž . the equilibrium equation E2 or ET2 exists, but this unique solution is not increasing. For the other type, a solution does not exist. EXAMPLE H. Consider a third-price auction with three risk-neutral agents, in which the distribution function is F. By Proposition C, the 16 Ž . Ž . Ž . Griesmer et al. 1967 , Myerson 1981 , and Maskin and Riley 1996 Ž . be extended to the whole interval because lim b¨s ϱ. So here thë ª 1 problem is that agents' bids are too high. We conjecture that such a problem can be resolved by imposing natural capacity constraints on the players' resources. We do not know of any example of u g RA for which equation E2 does not have a solution.
Noncontinuous Strategies
In this paper we deal only with equilibrium with continuous strategies. When one is interested in equilibrium with merely measurable strategies, it is reasonable to slightly change the definition of equilibrium as follows:
Ž . AE In equilibrium every player i is maximizing his conditional expectation given his type¨, for almost e¨ery type¨.
i i Ž . Note that an equilibrium strategy satisfies AE if and only if it is an ex Ž ante equilibrium. So, in our paper as well as in most of the literature of . auction theory we require optimality everywhere with respect to given 17 Ž versions of the conditional probability distributions see, e.g., Billingsley, . 1979 , and therefore we have to be sure that our results do not depend on Ž . the particular version of the conditional expectation given in 2.1 , while in Definition AE, we require optimality only almost surely, and therefore it does not matter which version of the conditional expectation is chosen. If we restrict attention to continuous strategies, then in our setup Definition AE and the standard definition of equilibrium yield the same equilibria set. However, if we allow discontinuous strategies, Definition AE may yield a bigger equilibria set. Consider Example I: by assigning an arbitrary value Ž . Ž . to b 1 we get an equilibrium in the sense of AE , which is not an
